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LAW OF REPELLING FLOODS
IN MISSOURI
by Peter N. Dovis'
wo events in 1993 affected the law of
repelling floodwaters in Missouri. The
first was the Great Flood on the Mis-
souri River. The second was a pair of
decisions, Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri
Highway & Transportation Comm'n in Au-
gust by the Missouri Supreme Court' and
Campbell v. Anderson in October by the
Missouri Court of Appeals.3 They held that
Missouri henceforth will apply the compara-
tive reasonableness rule to drainage waters
and floodwaters rather than the common
enemy rule followed for the past 110 years.
This article will discuss how that change in
rule will affect the rights and liabilities of
landowners building levees to repel floodwa-
ters. In particular, it will examine whether the
change in rule will affect where levees can be
built in the future.
This article first will address the law of
repelling floodwaters nationally and in Mis-
souri. That law focuses on two questions,
what waters are subject to the law of flood-
waters, and what rules apply to floodwaters.
Then this article will examine what changes
in levee design standards and location will be
required by the change in rule. The typical
case using this law involves two landowners,
one of whom builds a levee which diverts or




There is a considerable variation between
the states in the definition of floodwaters.
Some states define floodwater as overflow
from a stream or watercourse.5 Some states
treat floodwaters in the flood channel or
floodway as part of the stream.6 Some states
require that the flood overflow remain con-
nected to the water in the natural channel.
Other states require that the overflow be
separated from the water in the natural
channel.8 Those contradictory definitions
represent the endpoints on the spectrum of
floodwater definitions. Other states,' includ-
ing Missouri,10 merely require that floodwa-
ters be flowing beyond the banks of the
stream or watercourse.
Drainage water is defined negatively as
water outside the channel of a watercourse
and affirmatively as water flowing over the
surface of the ground.' Drainage water
flows occasionally only after rains or snow-
melts. 2 Missouri accepts that definition of
drainage water. 3
Floodwaters are distinguished from drain-
age water by being waters which have left a
watercourse, rather than being water which
has yet to enter a watercourse." Some
states hold that such floodwaters retain that
status even if they become separated from
the natural channel,'5 while others hold that
once separation has occurred, the floodwa-
ters become drainage waters.'6 Like some
states,' 7 Missouri has always applied the
same rule to both drainage waters and
floodwaters,'s so it has never attempted to
define floodwaters or to distinguish between
them and drainage waters. The Heins and
Campbell decisions dramatically alterthie
common law rule applying to drainage wa-
ters and floodwaters.
Drainage Rules
TheAmerican states havedeveloped three
alternative rules for dealing with drainage
waters, the common enemy rule, the civil
law rule, and the comparative reasonable
I© 1995 Peter N. Davis. Isidor Loeb Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A. 1959, Haverford; LLB. 1963, S.J.D. 1972, University of Wisconsin. Member
of Bars of Missouri. Wisconsin. District of Columbia, U.S. Supreme Court, and U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. This article was previously published in an earlier version in the
Proceedings of the 4th Annual Water Quality Conference 1-17 (Mo. Agric. Expt. Sta., Univ. of Missouri-Columbia, Feb. 3, 1994). I wish to thank Margaret Toalson and Rayford
Chambers of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law for their research assistance on this article.
2 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1993).
'866 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. CL App. 1993).
4See, e.g., Weaver v. Bishop, 254 Cal.Rptr. 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) Foss-SchneiderBrewing Co. v. Uand, 199 N.E 454 (Ohio 1918); Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816 (Or.
1953).
s Everett v. Dais. 115 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1941).
'See. ag., O'Connell v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 13 S.E. 489 (Ga. 1891); Clements v. Phoenix Util. Co., 237 P..1062 (Kan. 1925); Courter v. Maloley, 41 N.W.2d
732 (Neb. 1950);Stockerv. Wells,33 N.W.2d 445 (Neb. 1948); Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 102 P.79 (Okla. 1909);Bassv. Taylor, 90S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1936;Sundv. Keating,
259 P.2d 1113 (Wash. 1953).
1 See. e.g., O'Connell v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co., 13 S.E. 489 (Ga. 1891); Sun Undenvriters Ins. Co. v. Bunkley, 233 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. CL App. 1950).
8See. e.g.. Southern Pac. Co. v. Proebstel, 150 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1944).
' See, eg.. Wiese v. Klassen, 129 N.W.2d 527 (Neb. 1964).
1o See, e.g., Atchison. T. & SF. Ry. v. Taylor, 87 F.Supp. 313 (E.D. Mo. 1949); Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & Levee Dist., 274 S.W. 448 (Mo. 1925); Schalk v. Inter-
River Drainage Dist.. 226 S.W. 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921).
" Keyton v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R, 224 S.W.2d 616 (Mo.App. 1949).
1 Pack v. Herrington, 109 111. 611 (1884); Fyer v. Wam 29 Wis. 511 (1872); RESTATEMEuT (SECOND) OF Toms § 846 (1979).
" Happy v. Kenton, 247 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. 1952).
" Southern Pac. Co. v. Proebstel, 150 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1944).
IsId.
6 O'Connell v. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co., 13 S.E 489 (Ga. 1891); Niccurn v. Atchison. T. & S.F. Ry, 78 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1938); Courter v. Maloley 41 N.W.2d 732 (Neb.
1950); Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816 (Or. 1953).
" See. eg., Honey v. Bertig Co., 150 S.W.2d 214 (Ark. 1941); Marshland Rood Control Dist. v. Great Northern Ry., 428 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1967).
" See, e.g.. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Taylor, 87 F.Supp. 313 (E.D. Mo. 1949); Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & Levee Dist., 274 S.W. 448 (Mo. 1925k Schalk v. Inter-
River Drainage Dist., 226 S.W. 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921).
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use rule. As will be discussed below, Mis-
souri switched from the common enemy rule
to the comparative reasonable use rule in
1993. This section discusses the three drain-
age rules of the United States.
Common enemy rule. The common en-
emy rule conceives that drainage water is a
scourge which each landowner is entitled to
remove by any physical means available.
Hence, each landowner may deal with,
dispose of, block, or divert diffused surface
water in any manner as he sees fit, without
legal liability for the injurious consequences
to his neighbors' lands.19 This gives the
upper landownerthe rightto dischargedrain-
age wherever is convenient on his lower
neighbors; and it gives the lower landowners
the right to block drainage and to pen it back
on his upper neighbors. It encourages hy-
draulic warfare and a lack of concern for
neighbors. The common enemy rule was
one of several rules favoring development
developed by the American courts in the
nineteenth century2o and is considered the
classic common law rule.2' Most common
enemy rule cases deal with inadequate bridge
openings, levees, and urban storm water
drains. The consequences of the rule are
especially egregious in urban areas.Y Thir-
teen jurisdictions besides Missouri followed
the common enemy rule in 1992.s
Oneimportantlimitationonactivitiesunder
the common enemy rule has evolved. The
dominant landowner may not accumulate
drainage water and then discharge it onto
servient land.24 With that limitation, the rule
has become known as the modified com-
mon enemy rule. Note also, that silt carried
by drainage water and deposited on land is
treated as a trespass, not under the common
enemy rule.2s
Civil law rule. The civil law rule was
adopted in some states to avoid the harsh-
ness of the common enemy rule. It provides
that drainage must be allowed to follow its
natural directions.26 The upper landowner is
not allowed to redirect drainage artificially,
and the lower landowner is forbidden to
obstruct natural drainage.Y Hence, each
upper landowner has a servitude or implied
easement over the lower landowner's land.
The purpose of the civil law rule is to
preserve the natural drainage pattern and to
prohibit landowners from taking unfair ad-
vantage of each other. The civil law rule in
the United States is derived from the French
Civil Code and originated in Louisiana." To
avoid impractical rigidity and to allow some
development, some civil law rule states have
allowed small alterations in the natural drain-
age pattern, such as draining small ponds
and substituting artificial drains for natural
ones.2 Seventeen jurisdiction continue to
follow the civil law rule."'
Comparative reasonable use rule. In the
second half of the twentieth century, Ameri-
can states have been shifting away from the
common enemy and civil law rules. The
courts find the common enemy rule too
lenient and the civil law rule too rigid in their
unmitigated forms. They find that modifica-
tions to both rules point toward the reason-
ableness and flexibility of the comparative
reasonable use rule.3 1 Under the compara-
tive reasonable use rule, each landowner is
allowed to dispose of, block, or divert drain-
age in ways which do not unreasonably
"Baltzegerv. Carolina Midland Ry., 32 S.E. 358 (S.C. 1899); Sund v. Keating, 259 P.2d 1113 (Wash. 1953). On the common enemy doctrine generally, 2WATERAND WATER
Riom§ 10.03, Id. at 5WATERANDWATER RIGHTS 59.02(b)(R. Beck 2d ed. 1991, supp. 1993);seeGraham. The Reasonable Use Rule in Surface Water Law. 57 Mo. L REV.
223 (1992); Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Governing Interference with Drainage of Surface Waters, 93 A.LR.3d 1216 (1979).
2 See, e.g., Timmons v. Clayton. 259 S.W.2d 501 (Ark. 1953); Barkley v. Wlcox, 86 N.Y. 140 (1881); Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L 351 (1865).
2 Thefirst common enemy rule decision was an Ameican one, Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 171 (1851). England picked up the rule very quickly.SeeRawstron
v. Taylor, 11 Ex. 369, 156 Eng.Rep. 873 (1855), and Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, 11 Ex. 602, 156 Eng.Rep. 971 (1856).
2 See Charles Bridges, Comment, The Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L REv. 76 (1977).
3 Alabama (urban areas), Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Indiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. See.
e.g., Deldev Vann, 182 So.2d 885 (Ala. 1966); Bahman v. Estes Homes, 710 P.2d 1087 (Ariz. CL App. 1985k Boyd v. Greene County, 644 S.W.2d 615(Ark. Ct. App. 1983);
Ballard v. Ace Wrecking Co., 289 A.2d 888 (D.C. 1972);Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978) State, Dep'tofHighways v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1988); Gruber
v. County of Dawson, 439 N.W.2d 446 (Neb. 1989k Grosso v. Long Island Lighting Co., 424 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980k Haenchen v. Sand Products Co.. Inc., 626
P.2d 332 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Glenn v. School Dist. No. 5, 366 S.E.2d 47 (S.C. 1988) Mullins v. Greer 311 S.E.2d 110 (Va. 1984) City of Benton v. Adrian. 748 P.2d
679 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). See generally Graham, supra note 19, at 231-35; state water law summaries, at 6 WATER AND WATER RMGs, supra note 19.
24 Blue Ridge Poultry & Egg Co., Inc. v. Clark, 176 S.E.2d 323 (Va. 1970).
2 Blue v. Charles F Hayes & Assoc., Inc. 215 So.2d 426 (Miss. 1968)(discussing the distinctions between nuisance and trespass); cf. Moreland v. Acadian Mobile Homes Park.
Inc., 313 So.2d 877 (La. CL App. 1975), writ denied 319 So.2d 442 (La. 1975).
21 Goble v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 200 S.E. 259 (Ga. 1938); Kauffman v. Grieserner, 26 Pa. 407 (1856).
2 Fenwick v. Bluebird Coal Co., 140 N.E.2d 129 (111. 957); Niagara Oil Co. v. Jackson, 91 N.E. 825 (Ind. CL App. 1910); Moreland v. Acadian Mobile Homes Park. Inc.. 313
So.2 d 877 (La. Ct. App. 1975), writ denied319 So.2d 442 (La. 1975k Masonite Corp. v. Windham, 48 So.2d 622 (Miss. 1950k Harbison v City of Hillsboro. 204 P. 613(Or.
1922).
u CooE NAPOLon art. 640 (1804) (Am.ed. 18411; Orleans Nay. Co. v. Mayor of New Orleans. 2 Mart. 214 (La. 1813).
29Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501 (1838); Harbison v. City of Hilsboro. 204 P. 613 (Or. 1922); La Reur v. Kolda, 22 N.W.2d 741 (S.D. 1946).
"Alabama (rural areas). Colorado. Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana. Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota. Tennessee, Texas.
and Vermont. Se- e.g., Robichaux v. Albic Dev. Co., 551 So.2d 1017 (Ala. 1989) (rural areas); Howard v. Cactus Hill Ranch Co.. 529 P.2d 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); City
ofColumbus v. Smih, 316 S.E.2d 761 (Ga. CL App. 1984); Merrill v- Penrod, 704 P.2d 950 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985);Dessen v. Jones, 551 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); OToole
v. Hathaway, 461 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1990h KAN. STAT. Am. § 24-105 (1986k Tool House, Inc. v. Tynes, 564 So.2d 720 (La. CL App. 1990k Mark Downs. Inc. v. McCormick
Properties, Inc., 441 A.2d 1119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Schmidt v. Eger, 289 N.W.2d 851 (Mich. CL App. 1980); Budagher v. Amrep Corp., 637 P.2d 547 (N.M. 1981)
Garbarino v. Van Oeave, 330 P.2d 28 (Or. 1958);Lafor v. Bethlehem Township, 499 A.2d 1373(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)S.D. CoDmE LAwsAA. § 46A-IOA-70 (1987);Gregoo,
v. Jenkins, 665 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. CL App. 1983); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.086 (1988) Powers v. Judd, 533 A.2d 139 (VL 1988). See genelly, Graham. supra note .
at 231-35; state water law summaries, at 6 WATER AND WATER Rioams, supra note 19.
3' See Graham, supra note 19, at 236.
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interfere with the use of his neighbor's land.
The rule compares the benefits and hard-
ships caused by a change in the natural
drainage pattern. If the hardships are unrea-
sonable under all the circumstances, there is
liability. 2 The comparative reasonable use
mule was adopted by some states beginning
in the early 20th century to avoid both the
hardships imposed by the common enemy
rule and the rigidities of the civil law rule.33 It
has been accepted by the Restatement (Sec-
ond), Torts.' Factors considered in making
the reasonableness comparison recited by
various cases include: the respective uses of
land and drainage water by each party,
topography, volume and direction of drain-
age, consequences of drainage, effects of
artificial changes in drainage, such as grad-
ing, hard surfaces, and artificial drains, alter-
natives, and avoidance of unnecessary in-
jury.35 Twenty-one jurisdictions besides Mis-
souri have adopted the comparative reason-
able use rule.36
Application of Surface Watercourse and
Drainage Water Rules to Floodwaters
Some states apply riparian rights rules to
flood waters; other states apply drainage
water rules to floodwaters. Which rules are
to be applied to floodwaters depends in part
on the state's rule determining whether the
floodwaters are considered to be part of the
stream. The states fall into two basic groups,
those which treat floodwaters as part of the
watercourse, and those which treat them as
drainage waters. The choice of rule in some
states is affected by whether the overflow
waters are from "ordinary" regularly-occur-
ring floods37 or "extraordinary" rarely-occur-
ring floods."8
Floodwaters are partof watercourse. Many
states treat ordinary regularly-recurring flood-
waters as part of the waters in a stream or
watercourse and apply the comparative rea-
sonable rule under the riparian rights doc-
trine 9 or the civil law of drainage. 0 A few
will apply watercourse rules even if those
floodwaters .become separated from the
stream.41 Those states do not apply drain-
age rules, such as the common enemy rule,
to those floodwaters. However, others apply
the common enemy drainage law rule to
ordinary regularly-recurring floodwaters
which have become disconnected from the
stream.42
Floodwaters are drainage waters. Some
states treat floodwaters similarly to drainage
waters. Some of them apply their drainage
water rules only when the floodwaters be-
come separated from the stream or water-
course.43 Other states apply their drainage
law rules to floodwaters outside the banks of
streams even when they remain connected
to the stream or watercourse." Some states
apply the common enemy rule only to ex-
traordinary rarely-occurring floodwaters,
B'Elison v City of San Buenaventura, 131 Cal. Rptr. 433 (Ca. Ct. App. 1976);Kallevigv. Holmgren, 197 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1972); Hallv. Wood, 443 So.2d 834 (Miss. 1983);
City of Franklin v. Durgee. 51 A. 911 (N.H. 1901); Annstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1977). In Clark County
v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Ney. 1980), the court elaborated on the rule this way
(A) landowner or user, acting in good faith, may drain surface waters and cast them on a neighbor's land if: (a) the injurious flow of waters is reasonably necessary
for drainage, (b) reasonable care is taken to avoid unnecessary injury; (c) the benefit to the drained land outweighs the gravity of harm inflicted upon the flooded land;
(d) the drainage is accompanied, where practicable, by the reasonable improvement and aiding of normal and natural systems of drainage in accordance with their
reasonable canying capacity; and (e) where no natural systems of drainage are available, the drainage is accomplished by the use of a reasonable, artificial system of
drainage.
:u Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 1982) (discussing the harshness of the common enemy rule and the civil law rule); City of Franklin v. Durgee, 51 A. 911 (N.H.
1901); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 1977).
* RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 821A-833 (1979) (applying private nuisance law).
3 See Klutey v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1968k Quist v. Kroenig, 410 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Dudley v. Beckey, 567 A.2d 573
(N.H. 1989); Clark County v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1980); Martin v. Weckerly. 364 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1985).
'Alabama (urban-rural boundary). Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey. North Carolina. North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, eg.,, Robichaux v. AFBIC'Dev. Co., 551 So.2d 1017 (Ala. 1989); Ostrem
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 648 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1982k Aalso v. Leslie Salt Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Page Motor Co. v. Baker, 438 A.2d 739 (Conn.
1980), Weldin Farms. Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Westland Skating v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542 So.2d 959 (Fla. 1989); Rodriguez v. State,
472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970); Klutey v. Commonwealth, Dept of Highways. 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1968) Von Heenberg v. Generazio, 531 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1988); Evers v.
Willaby. 444 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Harris v. Buxton T. V., Inc, 460 So.2d 828 (Miss. 1984); County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1980); Dudley
v. Beckey, 567 A.2d 573 (N.H. 1989); State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Rosenblum, 491 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 236 S.E.2d 787 (N.C.
1977); Martin v. Weckerly, 364 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1985) McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo., 402 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1980k Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I.
1975); Sanford v. University of Utah, 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971); Morris Assoc., Inc v. Priddy, 383 S.E.2d 770 (W.Va. 1989k Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac v. Willemsen,
384 N.W.2d 692 (Wisc. 1986). See generally, Graham, supra note 19, at 231-35; state water law summaries, at 6 WATR AND WATE RIGMs, supral note 19.
"Ordinary" floods are those which occur frequently enough to be predictable or expected from time to time. Clements v. Phoenix Util. Co., 237 P. 1062, 1065 (Kan. 1925).
3 Extraordinary" floods are those which occur so infrequently that their magnitude and destructiveness cannot be anticipated from ordinary foresight or the historic record.
Cements v. Phoenix Util. Co., 237 P. 1062, 1065 (Kan. 1925).
* Allely v. Fickel, 49 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1951); Clements v. Phoenix Util. Co., 237 P. 1062 (Kan. 1925) Courter v. Maloley, 41 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1950); Allen v. State, 143
N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1955); Town ofJefferson v. Hicks, 102 P. 79 (Olda. 1909); Spencer v. O'Brien, 158 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941); Bass v. Taylor, 90 S.W.2d
811 (Tex. 1936); Sund v. Keating 259 P.2d 1113 (Wash. 1953).
4o Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816 (Or. 1953).
41 O'Connell v. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 13 S.E. 489 (Ga. 1891); Clements v. Phoenix Util. Co., 237 P. 1062 (Kan. 1925) Sund v. Keating, 259 P.2d 1113 (Wash.
1953).
42 See infra note 43.43 Applying the common enemy rule to separated floodwaters: Gillespie Land and Irrigation Co. v. Gonzalez, 379 P.2d 135 (Ariz. 1963); Southern Pac. Co. v. Proebstel, 150
P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1944); Mogle v. Moore, 104 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1940); Sund v. Keating, 259 P.2d 1113 (Wash. 1953) (dictum). Applying the civil law rule to separated floodwate-s:
Sun Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Bunkley 233 S.W.2d 153 (lex. CL App. 1950).
4 Applying the common enemy rule to connected floodwaters: Missouri.Seeinfra notes 51-53. Applying the comparative reasonable use rule to connected floodwaters: Weaver
v. Bishop. 254 Cal.Rptr. 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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whether or not the floodwaters remain con-
nected to the watercourse.45
Act of God defense. Some states, which
ordinarily do not treat floodwaters as subject
to the common enemy rule, will deny liability
when flood damages result from such a
severe flood as tobe called an "actofGod".4
An "act of God" is a natural event, such as
a flood, of such large magnitude that it could
not be predicted from historic experience.
Missoui LAw
Prior Law: Common Enemy Rule
Drainage waters. Missouri applied the
common enemy rule to drainage waters,
subject to the accumulation and discharge
limitation, between 1874 and 1993. The
usual formulation and interpretations of the
rule were followed in Missouri." However, it
imposed liability for silt deposited by drain-
age water.49
Drain ways. Missouri applied a special rule
to drainage waters in drainways. It forbids
obstruction of drainage waters flowing in
drainways and allows use of drainways for
disposal of drainage waters up to their
natural capacity without interference.s
Floodwaters. Floodwaters in Missouri were
subject to the common enemy rule in the
same fashion as drainage waters, allowing a
landowner to ward them off by constructing
levees. No liability resulted from repelling
floodwaters to the injury of neighbors.5
Missouri applied the common enemy rule to
floodwaters more extensively than most
states. The common enemy rule applied
whether or not the floodwaters remained
connected to the stream or watercourse.Y
Repelling floodwaters under the common
enemy rule was subject to the same accumu-
lation and discharge limitation that applied
to drainage waters.?
New Law: Comparative Reasonable Use
Rule
Drainage waters. The Missouri Supreme
Court dramatically changed the rule apply-
ing to drainage waters in 1993. It did so in
a case involving an inadequately-sized high-
way culvert opening. Heins Implement Co.
v. Missoui Highway & Transportation
Comm'en held that the common enemy
rule had long outlived its usefulness and
replaced it with the comparative reasonable-
ness rule. It did that for several reasons. First,
literal application of the rule worked egre-
gious and arbitrary results.ss Second, the
accretion of modifications and limitations on
the application of the rule caused it to drift
toward the comparative reasonable use rule.?
Third, the comparative reasonableness stan-
dard has been adopted in Missouri for the
other two classes of water, surface water-
courses and percolating groundwater, uni-
formity among all three classes of water is
desireable-s Fourth, other states gradually
have been switching to the comparative
reasonableness nle and it has become the
dominant rule in the United States today."
Stating that "reasonableness is a question of
fact, to be determined in each case by
weighing the gravity of the harm to the
plaintiff against the utility of the defendant's
conduct", 59 the court concluded,
Perhaps the rule can be stated
most simply to impose a duty
upon any landowner in the use of
his or her land not to needlessly
or negligently injure by surface
water adjoining lands owned by
others, or in the breach thereof to
pay for the resulting damages."
It considers the new rule "as the one most
likely to promote the optimum development
and enjoyment of land, while ensuring that
their true costs are equitably distributed
among the competing interests at hand".6'
Applying the new rule, the court found
that defendant had attempted to determine
drainage flows in the area and that it had
been negligent in seeking relevant informa-
tion. Hence, it had failed to leam about
historic drainage flows there, information
that was readily available.62 In adopting the
I See, e.g., Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm'n, 241 US. 351 (1916); Weilman v. Keley 252 P.2d 816 (Or. 1953); McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah. 1957)
4Goblev. Louisville& Nashvile. R.R. Co., 200 S.E. 259 (Ga. 1938); Gulf Pomeroy, 3S.W. 722 (rex. 1887); Cements v. Phoenix Lill. Co., 237 P. 1062 (Kan. 1925) (dictum).
4 Gements v. Phoenix Util Co., 237 P. 1062 (Kan. 1925).
" Milard Fanms, Inc. v. Sprock 829 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. CL App. 1991); Hansen v. Gary Naugle Constr. Co., 801 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1990); Haith v. County ofAtchison 793 S.W.2d
151 (Mo. CL App. 1990); MH. SiegfriedRealEstate v. OlyofIndependence, 649 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1983); Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. 1983) Isubject to "due
care" and "collection and discharge modifications; Wets V. State Highway CommAn, 503S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973); Halerkamp v. OtyofRock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958k
Happy v. Kenton, 247 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. 1952); Casanover v. Vanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1948); Abbott v. Kansas City, St.J. & CB. R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884);
McCormick v. Kansas Oty St.J. & C.B. R.R., 57 Mo. 433 (1874).See generally, Davis, Missouri, in 6 WAT AND WATE RIGTrs 237, 243-45 (R. Beck 2d ed. 1991, supp. 1993);
Graham, supra note 19, at 240-44; Bridges, supra note 22; Snodgrass & Davis, The Law of Surface Water in Missour, 24 Mo. L Rev. 137. 281 (1959).
9 Wells v. State Highway Commn, 503 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Mo. 1973) (overruling Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Mo. CL App. 1948)).
5 MillardFarms, Inc. v Sprock, 829 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. CL App. 1991)(dictum); Weirv. Mrlknes, 688 S.W.2d 53(Mo. CL App. 1985); Borymann v. ForissantDeK Co., 515 S.W.2d
189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958).
5 Brown v. H & D Duenne Fans, Inc., 799 S.W2d 621 (Mo. CL App. 1990); Schulze v. Monsanto Co.. 782 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. CL App. 1989); Senkevech v. Vaughn. 610
S.W.2d 399 (Mo. CL App. 1980); Dudley Special Road Dist. v. Harrison, 517 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Camden Special Road Dist. v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93 (Mo.
CL App. 1973k City of Hardin v. Norbome Land Drainage Dist., 360 Mo. 1112, 232 S.W.2d 921 (Mo. 1950); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Taylor 87 F.Supp. 313 (E.D.
Mo. 1949); Keener v. Sharp, 95 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. CL App. 1936); Sigler v. Inter-RiverDrainage Dist., 279 S.W. 50 (Mo. 1925); Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & L.evee Dist.
274 S.W. 448 (Mo. 1925Y. Goil v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 197 S.W. 244 (Mo. 1917).
* See id.
* Blackburn v. Gaydon. 245 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. CL App. 1951).
* 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1993).
" Id. at 689. The court commented, the practical consequence of adherence to this rule has been described as "a neighborhood contest between pipes and dikes from which
*breach of the peace is often inevitable.'" Id.
" Id.
s Id. at 691, citing Bolinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964)(suface watercoursesh Higday v. Nickoaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)(percolating groundwater).
" Heins. 859 S.W.2d at 690, n. 13, citing a host of cases. States which have adopted the comparative reasonableness rule are listed. supra note 36.
9 Id. at 689.
I id. at 690.
6 Id. at 691.
62 Id at 684, 686, 691.
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reasonable use rule, Missouri is following a
trend in the United States towards that rule
and away from both the common enemy
rule and the civil law rule.
Floodwaters. Shortly after Heins was de-
cided, the Missouri Court of Appeals ex-
tended the comparative reasonable use rule
to floodwaters. It did so in a case involving
flooding from a private stream
rechannelization project.Campbell v. Ander-
sorP held that the new comparative reason-
able use rule should be applied to floodwa-
ters because the Heins decision stated that a
uniform rule should be applied to all classes
of water in Missouri." Although Campbellis
somewhat confusing because the court failed
to designate the class of water involved, its
discussion of the issue of retroactive applica-
tion of the new Heins rule"' would make no
sense if the court had considered the flood-
ing to be the result of an obstruction or
alteration of a watercourse; the comparative
reasonable use rule has always applied to
watercourses under the riparian rights doc-
trine. By implication, the waters in Campbell
must be floodwaters. Therefore, Campbell
extended the application of the comparative
reasonable use rule under Heins from drain-
age waters to floodwaters. 6'
Campbell has three effects. First, it abol-
ishes the nonliability or immunity created by
the common enemy rule. Second, it restores
the judicial policy of prior cases of applying
the same rule to both drainage waters and
floodwaters.' 7 Third, it forces a reexamina-
tion of design standards for siting and con-
struction of levees. No longer can a land-
owner assume that there will be no liability
regardless of where or how high a levee is
built.
Impact of New Rule on Landowner Practice
This article will now reexamine the siting
and design standards for levees in light of
Missouri's adoption of the comparative rea-
sonable use rule by Heins and Campbell.
Since, of course, there are no flooding cases
decided in Missouri other than Campbell, we
must look at flooding cases in other com-.
parative reasonable use rule states for en-
lightenment.
Research reveals a few flooding cases
decided in other comparative reasonable
use rule states. They fall into two groups:
(1) flooding from blocked drainage ditches,
and (2) flooding from streambank levees
preventing overflow across land. Both groups
of cases compare the damage caused to
plaintiff by the flooding with the utility and
benefits to defendant resulting from blocking
the ditches or building the levees. There is no
analysis of cases involving ponding from
surface drainage obstructions and discharge
of concentrated surface drainage.6"
Blocked drainage ditch cases. In Duevel v.
Jennissen,69 defendant constructed a drain-
age ditch into which his farm tile drain field
drained. The drainage ditch led across
plaintiffs land. Defendant could farm an
additional 50 acres with no hann to plaintiff.
Later, plaintiff constructed a similar system.
Instead of using the drainage ditch for the
discharge from his own and defendant's
drain fields, he blocked the drainage ditch
leading from defendant's land and installed
an 8-inch inlet and a pump to remove his
own and defendant's drainage into the river.
Plaintiff also built a dike between his and
defendant's land. When the pump broke
down, drainage backed up onto defendant's
land, flooding about 50 acres and causing
crop loss. Then the dike broke, flooding
plaintiff's land as well. Plaintiff sued to enjoin
the flooding from defendant's land and de-
fendant counterclaimed for obstruction of
the drainage ditch. The court affirmed the
finding of the trial court that defendant's
system was reasonable under the compara-
tive reasonable use rule, and that plaintiff's
blocking the ditch was not reasonable be-
cause his system was inadequate to handle
the combined drainage flows.
In so deciding, Duevel recited four guide-
lines for applying the comparative reason-
able use rule to drainage:
(a) There is a reasonable necessity
for such drainage;
(b) If reasonable care be taken to
avoid unnecessary injury to the
land receiving the burden (of the
drainage water];
(c) If the utility or benefit accruing to
the land drained reasonably out-
weighs the gravity of the harm
resulting to the land receiving the
burden;
(d) If, where practicable, it is ac-
complished by reasonably improv-
ing and aiding the normal and
natural system of drainage accord-
ing to its reasonable carrying ca-
pacity, or if, in the absence of a
practicable natural drain, a reason-
able and feasible artificial drainage
system is adopted.70
The court noted that the rule cannot be
reduced to a cut-and-dried formula. What is
a reasonable use is determined by the par-
ticular facts of each case.7'
h Pearce v. Pearce72 defendant pro-
posed to block several natural sloughs and
drains, causing the drainage water to be
diverted onto plaintiff's land after heavy
rains. The court of appeals affirmed an
injunction against construction of the
defendant's proposed dike on the ground
that it was unreasonable for him to divert the
heavy drainage without providing means to
mitigate the flooding that would result.
Levee cases. There are a few levee cases,
which divide in result.
Cases holding levees reasonable. In
AALSO v. Leslie Salt Co.,73 levees were
constructed by the early 1950s by defendant
around its salt evaporating ponds along the
shore of San Francisco Bay. These levees
protected the bayside city of Alviso from the
tides. The city was located below sea level
because of subsidenceresulting from ground-
water withdrawal. During very unusually
heavy rains in 1983, the city was flooded by
"866 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
' Id. at 144.
6s Id. at 144-45.
*Since the trial court had reached its decision under the common enemy rule before Heins had been decided, the Campbell court remanded the case for evidence on the issue
of comparative reasonableness. Id. at 145.
" See supra note 51.
" Those are the typical situations in classic surface drainage cases.
a 352 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. CL App. 1984).
7o id. at 96, citing Enderson v. Kelehan, 32 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Minn. 1948).
71 Duevel, 352 N.W.2d at 96.
7297 So.2d 329 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1957).
7 267 Cal.Rptr. 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Vol. 2 * No. 3
rainwater overflowing from a creek and
ponding behind the levees. A class action
was brought by damaged property owners
against defendant. The trial court granted
summary judgment to defendant on the
ground that the levees were reasonable and
this it had no affirmative obligation to pre-
vent flooding caused by major rains. The
court of appeals affirmed, stating addition-
ally that the public benefited from the bird
habitat provided by the ponds and that the
govemment should be responsible for con-
structing necessary major storm drainage
works.
Cases holding levees unreasonable. In
Tahan v. Thomas,74 defendant constructed
a levee to protect his land from river over-
flows that occurred every 2 or 3 years.
Twenty years later, the state constructed a
highway which breached the levee. Plaintiff
purchased land nearby in 1965 and relied on
the fact that floodwater would flow through
the breach and, therefore, would not flow
onto his own land. During a flood in 1967,
defendant constructed a temporary dike
across the highway to close the levee breach.
Plaintiff's land was flooded as a result. The
trial court granted summary judgment to
defendant in plaintiffs suit for damages. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that,
while defendant could construct levees on
his own land, it was unlawful for him to
construct a temporary dike on a public
highway. It found defendant's actions unrea-
sonable.75
Levee cases not reaching a decision on
the merits. InLinvillev. Perello,76defendant's
levee on the same side of the river as
plaintiff's land blocked the flow of floodwater
across defendant's land and caused floods to
concentrate its overflow over plaintiff's land,
increasing erosion damage. Expressly re-
jecting the common enemy rule applied by
the trial court, the court of appeals held the
utility of the conduct should be weighed
against the gravity of the harm, and re-
manded the case for a new trial.
In Gilmer v. Board of Commissioners of
Marshall County,n a farmer constructed a
levee parallel to a low-lying rural road to
prevent rainwater from flowing from the
road onto his fields. The county had insuffi-
cient funds to construct a drainage ditch
along the road. The levee caused water to
pond on the roadway after heavy rains. After
the county obtained a temporary injunction
requiring the farmer to cut his levee, six acres
of his field were flooded, causing crop loss.
The farmer sued to dissolve the temporary
injunction. Expressly rejecting the common
enemy rule, the court of appeals adopted the
comparative reasonable use rule.78 It held
that the trial court's refusal to dissolve the
injunction was an abuse of discretion and
remanded the case for further hearings.
Riparian rights levee cases. Many states
apply the riparian rights doctrine of surface
watercourses to the construction of levees
along streams. These cases are more in-
structive than the drainage water law cases.
Under the comparative reasonable use rule
of riparian rights, riparian owners may pro-
tect their lands from occasional flood over-
flows by constructing bankside levees.79 But
the owner has no right to protect his land
from flood overflowsbyconstructingbankside
levees if they would cause deflection of an
unreasonable amount of overflow waters
from ordinary floods, significantly damaging
the lands of other riparians. 0 That means
the levees should be placed to avoid causing
erosion, destruction or injury to other ripar-
ian lands.81 In "battle of the levees" cases,
one riparian may construct levees to repel
floodwaters deflected by another riparian's
levees.82 Those levee cases imply that the
floodplain, floodway, or flood channel are
considered to be part of the watercourse
itself, and some of them so hold."3 Some of
these cases found the bankside levees to be
reasonable." Other cases found the levees
to be unreasonable.as Since the comparative
reasonable use rule is the same for riparian
rights and drainage water, the surface water-
course cases presumably apply it identically
to the drainage water rule cases.
Analysis. These cases all weigh the utility
of the conduct against the gravity of the
harm. The comparative reasonable use rule
suggests that landowners may repel floods
by constructing levees or by diverting the
flow in drainage ditches, but that the flood-
ing which results or is increased elsewhere
must not be unreasonable. A landowner
located in an area prone to flooding must
expect some flooding and may take actions
to reduce it, such as by building levees,
provided other landowners are not subjected
to significant increases in flood risks or
damage. The cases do not enable a more
precise statement of the reasonableness
balance than that.
Application of new rule to new levees.
New levees will be subject to the compara-
tive reasonable use standard in unmitigated
form, since the new rule antedates their
4 86 Cal.Rptr. 440 (Cal. Q. App. 1970).
n It would be absurd to hold that a landowner whose land was made susceptible to inundation from flood waters as the result of the construction of a public improvement and
who was adequately compensated by the public agency for the injury, may nevertheless interfere with the improvement, to the detriment of adjoining landowners and taxpayers,
in order to protect his land from the very contingency for which he was compensated with tax funds, and that his conduct was reasonable as a matter of law under the "public
enemy" doctrine. Id at 443.
1' 234 Cal.Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
"428 N.E.2d 1318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
* Ofing Rounds v. Hoelscher, 428 N.E.2d 1308 (Ind. CL App. 1981), decided the same day.
Spencer v. O'Brien, 158 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. CL App. 1941).
O'Connellv. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. Co., 13 S.E. 489 (Ga. 1891); Cements v. Phoenix Uil. Co., 237 P. 1062 (Kan. 1925); Spencer v. O'Brien, 158 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn.
CL App. 1941); Bass v. Taylor, 90 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1936). Some cases from the era when courts were emphasizing the natural flow right under the riparian doctrine, stated
that a levee cannot cause any increase in volume or velocity of flood overflow. Courierv. Maloly, 41 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1950); Frese v. Michalec, 28 N.W.2d 197 (Neb. 1947);
Oxfway v Vilage of Canisteo, 21 N.Y.S. 835 (N.Y. 1893). That should not be good law today, since almost all states today emphasize the right to make a reasonable use of water
under the riparian doctrine.
as Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 102 P. 79 (Ola. 1909).
a Courter v. Maloley, 41 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1950); Wdhelm v. Burfeyson, 11 S.E 590 (N.C. 1890).
83 Courter v. Maoiley, 41 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1950).
" Cements v. Phoenix Util. Co., 237 P. 1062 (Kan. 1925); Courter v. Maloley 41 N.W.2d 732 (Neb. 1950); Spencer v. O'Bfrn, 158 S.W.2d 445 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).
1 Frese v. Michalec. 28 N.W.2d 197 (Neb. 1947) (natural flow rule); Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 102 P. 79 (Okl. 1909); Bass v. Taylor, 90 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1936).
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design; landowners can take into account
the new rule in designing and siting those
levees. Hence, new levees may not be
located and channels may not be relocated
where they will cause unreasonable flooding
on neighboring properties. The factors a
court would consider in a lawsuit, and a levee
designer should take into account, are the
following:
(1) significance of the increase in the levels
of floods on previously flooded land,
(2) significance of the increase in fre-
quency or duration of flooding,
(3) significance of the enlargement in area
flooded of previously flooded land, and
(4) the threat of flooding to previously
unflooded land, buildings or other high-value
improvements.
The balancing will include a comparison
between the prior injury to previously unpro-
tected land and the new injury to newly
flooded land. If the injury to the newly
flooded land would significantly exceed the
prior injury to the previously unprotected
land, the protection works probably are
unreasonable and exposes its owner to liabil-
ity.
Application of new rule to old levees.
Levees in existence before the change in
rule under Heins and Campbell ought to be
treated differently from new levees. Old
levees and channel relocations should be
grandfathered because landowners relied on
the old rule in designing and siting them.
That proposition is supported by a state-
ment in Campbelithat there was no reliance
on the old rule in that case, even though the
old rule was in force when the channel
relocation occurred. 6 Thatstatementstrongly
suggests that when there is reliance on the
common enemy rule in designing and siting
a levee, it is not fair (and perhaps unconsti-
tutional) to impose a new liability rule retro-
actively.
That means certainly that undamaged
levees need not be moved in order to meet
the new design and siting standard under the
comparative reasonable use rule. It ought to
mean as well that existing levees which have
been damaged by the Great Flood of 1993
can be repaired without being relocated.
Thecostof relocation would be much greater
than the cost of repair in place. However,
levees which have been so extensively dam-
aged that they must be reconstructed prob-
ably will lose grandfather rights and will be
subject to the new rule.87
Drainway rule.
Missouri probably will retain the rule that
a drainway cannot be obstructed; it might
allow some overflow of the natural capacity
of drainways, if the overflow is not unreason-
able. The reason is the policy of the rule, that
the upper landowner has a reasonable ex-
pectation that the natural drainage through
the drainway will not be interrupted. That
expectation was protected by the prior law,
and is a reasonable expectation.
Act of God defense.
The Act of God defense for extraordinary
floods has been applied only in drainage
cases in civil law states and in surface
watercourse cases under the riparian rights
doctrine. The Act of God defense, in effect,
applies the common enemy rule to such
floods. There are no Act of God cases in
drainage water cases under the comparative
reasonable use rule. Since the civil law rule
and the comparative reasonable use rule
both restrict alterations to the drainage pat-
tern, exempting extraordinary floods from
the usual liability rule could be applied analo-
gously to comparative reasonable use rule
drainage cases. Nonetheless, we cannot
predict whether the Missouri courts will
retain the common enemy rule for extraor-
dinary floods while applying the compara-
tive reasonable use rule to ordinary floods.
There is no intrinsic reason under the
comparative reasonable use rule for reject-
ing the Act of God defense in flooding cases.
Injuries from extraordinary floods are not
foreseeable and the cost of avoiding injury
from them can be extremely high. Rejecting
the Act of God defense would call for accept-
ing massive damage to ones own property in
order to avoid similar damage to adjoining
properties. That may be too much for the
law to expect.
Strong as those arguments are, the Mis-
souri courts may conclude that granting
immunity from liability for repelling extraor-
dinary floods is an overreaction to the prob-
lem. Rather, they may consider the
unpredictability of major floods to be a
significant factor in the balancing test under
the comparative reasonable use rule.
Conclusions
We can draw several conclusions from
Heins and Campbell, the prior Missouri law
of floods, and the cases from other states:
(1) Missouri traditionally has applied the
same legal rules to both drainage water and
floodwater.
(2) In 1993, Missouri overruled the com-
mon enemy rule and substituted the com-
parative reasonable use rule as to both
drainage waters and floodwaters.
(3) The comparative reasonable use rule
requires a landowner to act in ways which do
not unreasonably interfere with the use of
adjoining properties.
(4) The comparative reasonable use rule
allows the construction of levees to repel
floodwaters, but only under circumstances
where adjoining properties are not unrea-
sonably flooded or injured.
(5) Old levees damaged in the 1993 flood
may be repaired without being relocated,
provided that the cost of reconstruction does
not exceed 75% of pre-damage value; grand-
father rights would be lost for more exten-
sively damaged levees.
(6) The prior drainway rule probably will
be preserved.
(7) There is no theoretical reason why the
Missouri should reject the Act of God de-
fense for flooding caused by levees during
extraordinary floods, because of the extraor-
dinarycircumstancesandlackofforeseeability
of such floods.
(8) While there is no precedent for apply-
ing such a no-liability rule for extraordinary
floods in any comparative reasonable use
rule state where such floods are considered
drainage waters, some riparian rights doc-
trine states applying the comparative rea-
sonable use rule to surface watercourses
have granted immunity for repelling extraor-
dinary floods.
86 Campbell v. Andeson, 866 S.W.2d 139, 144-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
7 t suggest that the same rule for grandfathering old structures and uses in zoning be applied in levee repair situations. If the cost of reconstruction is more than 75 percent of
the pre-damage value of the levee, grandfather rights probably ought to be lost.
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